ABSTRACT Recent surge in cyber physical systems (CPSs) which integrate cyber and physical worlds, increases security risks at both the surfaces. The wireless sensor communication network is one of the major components of the critical infrastructure in all networked systems including networked control systems and CPSs. As these systems support range of time and data sensitive applications, varying from health care to emergency services, to transport, and to environmental monitoring services, core sensor network component faces potential threats due to varying attacks, including wormhole attack that can cause damage to the control system in terms of data leakage, data dropping, and delayed delivery. It is also difficult to detect, as it requires neither nodes in the network to be compromised nor adversaries to acquire valid network identity to instigate such attacks. Many existing solutions in the literature to detect wormholes are based on node's static location information, synchronization of clocks, use of additional hardware, such as antennas and GPS, and neighborhood and traffic information, which may lead to large energy consumption. In this paper, a scalable and distributed scheme which uses sequential probability ratio test is proposed, to avoid single point failures and to handle high mobility, with no additional resource requirements. It is observed that wormholes are detected using few packets and detection is faster with increasing mobility. The system is highly customizable as system parameters can be chosen to balance the speed and accuracy of detection. System overheads in terms of communication, computation, and storage aspects are analyzed and presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart cities, smart transport, smart logistics, etc., adopt large scale wireless sensor networks (WSN) for monitoring and communicating parameters of interest in the arena of Internet of Things (IoT) and control system networks. Sensor networks with static and mobile nodes facilitate real-time data processing in large scale cyber physical systems (CPS) and networked control systems (NCS) as depicted in Fig 1. While smart technologies provide many benefits, security and privacy are the main challenges, as the deployment of sensor networks at large scale for different applications poses security threats. Since most of the sensor networks are usually deployed in uncontrolled environments without a central authority to manage them, the mobile nodes cooperate with each other to efficiently route data. As a consequence of mobility, lack of a central authority and limited resource availability, mobile sensor networks are vulnerable to a range of routing related security threats. The importance of security and privacy of IoT elements, including sensor networks in addition to other parameters of interest, namely energy efficiency, scalability and QoS was presented in [1] .
Cyber physical systems along with Internet of Things provide critical infrastructures like transportation networks, utility networks, communication and sensor networks and more. The synergy existing between CPS, IoT, NCS, and WSN, as shown in Fig. 2 , emphases the importance of WSN and its protection against attacks which degenerate the performance of the networked systems and reliability of networks, as it is a core component in these systems.
Sensor networks handling time critical and real time data are especially vulnerable to wormhole attacks due to their infrastructure-less nature. The impact of this attack on network flows and delays of NCS was presented in [2] and Lin and Chen [3] detailed the susceptibility of SCADA systems to wormhole attacks and the consequences on route changes for data hacking and service jamming.
In this range of attacks, the adversary places two powerful transceivers X and Y at distant locations in the network that can communicate with each other via a high-speed connection with an out-of-band channel. Being powerful transceivers, they can listen to packets transmitted by nodes in a larger area in the network. The modus operandi is very simple. X transmits any packet it receives and passes it on to Y , which in turn broadcasts the same packet so that every node within Y 's range can hear it.
As shown in Fig. 3 , when X captures a packet from node a meant for node c, it passes it to Y, which transmits the packet in the in-band channel of the wireless medium, so that every node within the coverage area of Y can receive it. Node c upon receiving the packet, acknowledges the reception thus creating an illusion that nodes a and c are neighbors, although they are separated by a large area geographically. Therefore, every node in the coverage areas of X and Y is under the illusion that they are neighbors.
The severity of the attack lies in the simplicity of launching it and the implicit difficulty involved in detecting it. All the adversary needs to launch this attack are two transceivers and a means of communication between them. Moreover, the adversary is not required to register its transceivers as legitimate nodes of the network, as they need not be identified as one to facilitate the attack. The transceivers do not need any information about data encryption, decryption and compression techniques used by the nodes since they do not try to break into the data packets for causing delay or re-routing the packets.
The difficulty in detecting the attack is due to the fact that no node is actually compromised and the transceivers are not visible to the network. Verifying the routes becomes a very difficult task. An adversary can use the wormhole attack as an initial step to launch other dangerous attacks. Having gathered a large number of packets from nodes in the transceivers' large coverage area, the adversary is able to use them for cryptanalysis, protocol identification and other such malicious activities. The adversary may also decide to drop all the packets it receives at a critical time so that communication is broken.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the related work in the domain of the proposed system and does some comparisons; Section III states the network model for which the system is designed; Sections IV and V describe the proposed mobile wormhole detection algorithm and computations; Section VI performs security and performance evaluation; Section VII calculates system overheads; Section VIII provides the experimental details and section IX concludes the work. Frequently used notations are tabulated in Table 1 .
II. RELATED WORKS
Most of the existing wormhole detection approaches rely on specific symptoms of the attack causing disharmony between the actual global network topology and the local topology assumed by affected nodes. Many of them assume the nodes are static and some provide solutions for mobile networks. Krotofil et al. [4] talked about the severity of the sensor spoofing attack in the chemical control process system where sensor signals are replayed later with noise. They have proposed a detection technique using information theoretic approach.
Some approaches relied on synchronized clocks for detection accuracy. Saswati et al. [5] reconstructed neighborhood based on computed RTT between node pairs and used topology change information to detect wormholes. Another RTT based approach to detect wormhole path by initiating a routing request broadcast for every source-destination pair was discussed in [6] . Adapting these methods to mobile networks is not feasible. Few approaches rely on the location information and detect attacks when the actual and assumed neighborhoods don't match. Many approaches used routing information to detect abnormalities as discussed below. As proposed in [7] , malicious nodes were detected based on identifying the best reliable neighbors using pairwise key pre-distribution technique and such cryptographic solutions may be a huge overhead for mobile sensor networks.
Ji et al. [8] proposed centralized and decentralized methods to detect wormholes by exploring the change of the flow directions of the packets caused by wormholes using local information that can be obtained from regular network coding protocols with reduced overheads. Dhurandher et al. [9] described a wormhole detection scheme based on the nodes' location information through ''Hello'' packets which increases the communication overhead. Although the time required for detection is low, the fact that each node is required to have a GPS attached to it not only increases the hardware cost but also impacts the node's energy consumption. Wang et al. [10] proposed a modified distance vector based DV-Hop localization algorithm to detect attacks using the average hop distance between beacon nodes and unknown nodes. Chen et al. [11] proposed a secure localization scheme to build a conflicting set for each locator based on the abnormalities during the message exchanges, which can be used to differentiate the dubious locators. Since these approaches rely on location information, they are not suitable for mobile environments.
Some approaches take the assistance of information provided by directional antennas as in [12] where an extended AODV protocol with Packet traversal time (PTT) for each hop was used to detect wormholes using maximum possible PTT values between legitimate nodes and in [13] , where a secured neighbor discovery scheme was proposed for directional wireless networks. A mobile beacon based solution for detecting wormholes in static WSNs was proposed in [14] using communication property violations between mobile beacon and each of the static beacons. In [15] , location based multi-path routing protocol using hop count variance was presented to detect wormholes in static networks. Methods using directional antennas impose additional hardware costs and energy consumption in a resource constrained environment.
Few approaches as stated below, use statistics on neighborhood information to detect wormhole nodes. Manish and Aggarwal [16] detected wormholes based on the rate of change in neighbor nodes. Eidie et al. [17] evaluated the honesty of nodes using relative hop distances of neigbors' neighbor lists to check for common neighbors and hence concluded on attack nodes. The detection method proposed in [18] depends on the assumptions that two fake neighbors have a longer RTT, compared to that with true neighbors and on sharing of true neighbors between true neighbors. Hop count analysis was used with AODV protocol to detect wormholes in [19] . In the work described in [20] , nodes attacked by worm holes are detected using secure check summing to find false data aggregated and further confirmed using a common neighborhood list. Using hop count, energy and distance parameters the secure route in MANETs is selected applying an artificial immune system to AODV protocol in [21] . One of our earlier works [22] on detecting routing based attacks in MANET suggested a trust based path discovery mechanism that can be integrated with AODV and DSR protocols, wherein the trusted routes are securely transmitted to the source and can be adopted for detecting presence of malicious nodes.
A distributed Detection of mobile malicious nodes in static sensor network was proposed by Ho et al. [23] , where sequential hypothesis test was applied to find if the nodes are silent for unusually long periods and concluded that those nodes may likely to be moving and malicious. That work was intended to detect mobile malicious nodes in a static environment. Another decentralized neighbor based method was proposed in [24] wherein the neighbors were attested as true neighbors after a k-hop connectivity test and it identified suspected nodes based on path existence test. Though the method provides good results for static and mobile environments with varying node densities, discovering and maintaining k hop neighbors for each node is an overhead. A method JITWORM was proposed in [25] where the wormholes were detected when the number of packets to which jitter applied by the neighboring nodes, exceeds a set threshold.
Guowei et al. [26] established wormhole detection through a change in neighborhood information. Each pair of nodes obtained a neighbor list with two transmission ranges through beacon messages and then compared the lists to arrive at the decision. Since every pair has to do this periodically, the communication overhead is increased and the energy of sensor nodes gets drained faster due to periodic beacon messaging and updating neighbor lists. It was assumed that the neighbors are static and cannot be applied for dynamic networks.
A distributed detection scheme for collaborative attacks has been proposed in [27] where additional special nodes were statically employed to detect malicious nodes. This method uses the statistics on route requests broadcasted among neighbors to detect wormholes, which increase the message overheads. Recently sequential analysis has been employed in [28] with software attestation to detect malicious nodes (worms). Here the adversary needs to compromise some nodes initially to infect them with self-propagating malicious codes which may propagate through the network to cause damage.
In order to address some shortcomings in the literatures surveyed, a sequential hypothesis testing based methodology to detect wormhole links in a mobile environment is proposed. Earlier we applied sequential hypothesis to detect replicating attacks in ad hoc networks in a decentralized manner [29] . A similar line of thought has been applied in this work, to devise a distributed detection strategy that can detect wormholes using only single hop neighbors. The system parameters can be chosen independent of network conditions to strike a balance between detection accuracy and time required for detection.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
Sensor network is modeled with N number of nodes deployed in a two dimensional field, where the nodes are able to roam freely throughout the field. Random Waypoint Model (RWP), a common mobility pattern governs the mobility. A node randomly selects a destination location in the field and starts moving towards it with a velocity V chosen randomly from the closed interval [V min , V max ]. Upon reaching the destination, it pauses for a particular time and chooses a new destination and velocity.
It is assumed that the wormhole is static as frequent mobility may disrupt the wormhole connectivity. It is also assumed that the adversary has not compromised any node in the network. The adversary places two long-range transceivers with a radio range of say, R wormhole separated by a significant distance and provides them with a provision to communicate with each other in an out-of-band channel so that the rest of the network is not aware of the communication. The transceivers pass on any packet they listen to each other. On receiving a packet from its partner, a transceiver broadcasts the packet so that all nodes in its range can hear it. This disrupts the network topology and can result in a series of dangerous attacks.
IV. WORMHOLE DETECTION STRATEGY
Wormhole detection of the proposed work is based on events generated by the nodes, which are fed as samples to the corresponding decision engines for making decisions on paths containing wormhole links. Each node maintains a routing table, which stores the next hop node to which the packet must be forwarded for reaching the particular destination node. The node generates an event; say a ''change'' CHG or ''un-change'' UNC event, for every destination node periodically after every seconds. Event generation and evaluation are detailed in the following section. These events are used to make a decision as to whether the path to that particular destination contains a wormhole link or not.
A. OVERVIEW OF SEQUENTIAL PROBABILITY RATIO TEST
The decision engine in each node uses Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) to make decisions on whether the path contains wormhole links or not, by evaluating the hypotheses for truth. SPRT [30] is used when a problem has two hypotheses H 1 and H 0 , where either H 1 or H 0 is only true but not both. The goal is to make a decision whether H 1 or H 0 is true. In conventional hypothesis testing, given a sample, a decision is made. However, SPRT makes a decision only when the available sample is sufficient to make one. If the sample does not provide enough evidence to conclude on an accurate decision, the decision is deferred. The test continues until a decision is made from strong enough samples.
The test considers conditional probabilities P(x|H 1 ) and P(x|H 0 ), to decide whether H 1 or H 0 is true. A sequence of observations (x 1 , x 2 , . . .) is made and for each observation x m , where m ≥ 1, the ratio P (x m | H1) /P (x m | H0) is calculated, provided P (x m | H0) = 0. This ratio is accumulated into a decision variable D m , which is recursively computed over enough samples until a decision is arrived using Dm−1 ×p (x m | H1) /P (x m | H0), where D 0 = 1. If D m is sufficiently large, then it is concluded that the sequence of observations made so far, have been generated under H 1 . Conversely, if D m is sufficiently small, it is concluded that the observations have been generated under H 0 . If D m is neither sufficiently large nor small, more observations are made. More specifically, the test is continued with another iteration using a new observation x m+1 .
To define how sufficiently large or small D m should be, for decision making, it is necessary to introduce two threshold values A and B. If D m ≥ A, it is concluded that H 1 is true and if D m ≤ B, we conclude that H 0 is true. However, if B < D m < A, at least one more iteration with a new observation x m+1 is made. These threshold values must be chosen carefully to minimize the error in decision making. For this purpose, two system parameters α and β are used, where α specifies the system tolerable level of false positives (deciding H 1 is true when in reality H 0 is true) and β, the system tolerable level of false negatives (deciding H 0 is true when in reality H 1 is true). According to [18] , the values of A and B are bounded by A ≤ (1 − β) /α and B ≥ β/ (1 − α) respectively, and the test provides a sufficient level of accuracy if the values of A and Bare chosen as (1 − β) /α and β/ (1 − α) respectively.
B. CAPTURING EVENTS
A node generates a CHG event for a particular destination node, if the next hop node to that destination has changed since it was recorded last time during the previous time slot (before seconds). If the next hop node to that destination has not changed since the last time it was recorded, a UNC event is generated. The events are then passed as samples to an SPRT decision engine which either decides that more samples are required, or that the path includes a wormhole link or that the path does not contain a wormhole link.
C. SPRT ADAPTATION FOR WORMHOLE DETECTION
At intervals of time period , a node u generates either a CHG or UNC event for every destination node v. These events are sent to the decision engine in u. Let P(u,v) = 1. The decision engine is designed in line with our previous work on clone detection [29] .
m ≤ B, the decision engine suggests that H 0 is true (i.e. P(u,v) is not infected). However, if B < D u,v m < A, the test is repeated for at least one more iteration with event x m+1 . Here the values of A and B are computed using system parameters α and β which specify the level of false positives and false negatives that can be tolerated by the system.
The conditional probabilities P(CHG|H 1 ), P(UNC|H 1 )), P(CHG|H 0 ), and P(UNC|H 0 ) in turn depend on the conditional probabilities of a UNC event being generated by a path free of wormhole links (due to the fact that the relative velocity between the source and destination was unexpectedly very low) and a UNC event being generated by a path containing wormhole links. Let the conditional probability that a UNC event is generated by an infected path be P wormhole and the conditional probability that a UNC event generated by path free of wormhole links be P legitimate .
V. COMPUTING OPTIMUM PERIOD TO COLLECT EVENTS
If R node is the transmitting range of a node's transmitter, then a node v ceases to be a neighbor of u if the distance between them exceeds R node . If d (u,v) is the distance between nodes u and v at an instant of time t 0 , then for node u to produce CHG events for all paths through v, the node v must have traveled a distance of (R node − d (u,v) ) away from u in a period of time equal to . Therefore, at times t 0 + , node v will not be a neighbor of node u and will cause to produce a CHG event by u for all destinations which have paths through v from u, as evident from 
It is assumed that all nodes move with the same velocity V , although in randomly chosen directions and relative velocity V (u,v) is defined as follows.
If d avg is the average distance between neighbors when nodes are randomly placed, then can be calculated VOLUME 6, 2018
By definition, the probability that the distance between two randomly chosen neighbor nodes, d avg , is 0.5 is. Therefore (6) holds true.
and we get value of d avg as
Using (4), (7), and (5) we derive as shown in (8), where the method used to select θ is explained later.
A. COMPUTING P legitimate
For updating the value of the decision variable, the values of the conditional probabilities P legitimate and P wormhole must be computed. These probabilities determine how fast SPRT makes a decision. The lower the value of P legitimate and higher the value of P wormhole , the faster is the decision made by the SPRT decision engine. In the context of the decision engine, a decision is made faster when it is made with a lesser number of samples or events. P legitimate Is the conditional probability that a UNC event is generated, although the path does not contain wormhole links. This is because the node v has remained a neighbor of node u even after a time period . This happens when V (u,v) , the relative velocity between v and u, has fallen below (V (1 − cos θ)), thereby rendering it unable to traverse the distance required to cross the range of u in time . If the paths are not infected, then all neighbors with a relative velocity less than (V (1 − cos θ )) will produce a UNC event and all those neighbors with a relative velocity greater than (V (1 − cos θ )) will produce a CHG event. Hence the conditional probability that legitimate paths produce a UNC event is given by
The component 2V indicates the maximum relative velocity when the nodes u and v move in the opposite direction, that is, when θ = 180. By decreasing θ , the value of P legitimate can be reduced, allowing the decision engine to make decisions using a lesser number of samples. However, as the time interval θ between collecting samples is increased, events are generated at a slower pace.
B. COMPUTING P wormhole
P wormhole is the conditional probability that a UNC event is generated by a path containing at least one wormhole link. This is because the transmitting range R wormhole of a wormhole is normally high compared to the transmitting range R node of a node as shown in Fig. 6 . As a result of this, most of the nodes will remain within the range of the wormhole thus producing a UNC event.
For a CHG event to be generated, after units of time, a neighbor v must traverse a larger distance (R wormhole -d avg ) by moving with a high velocity, say V v , resulting in higher relative velocity V (u,v) with respect to the decision making node u and V (u,v) is given by
Let θ be the inner angle of separation between velocity vectors V u and V v as shown in Fig. 7 .
Since (11) is rewritten as
Equating (8) and (12), we get the following.
and (1 − cos θ ) is given by
Similar to (10), we can write P wormhole as (17) It is hence seen that, the longer the range of the wormhole, easier and faster is the detection. Since the range of the wormhole is not known by the network administrator, R wormhole is set to the lower bound value of a wormhole's transmitting range, from which onwards the system seeks protection. Therefore the system does not promise protection to attacks with wormholes having a transmission range less than. However, these wormholes with very short transmitting range, which may not get detected, do not give any significant advantage to the attacker and hence are left out from further discussions.
VI. DETECTION ANALYSIS
In this section, an analysis on the speed of wormhole detection is presented along with methods to limit the error rate of the system.
A. SPEED OF DETECTION
The SPRT decision engine takes one event per candidate neighbor in every time slot. Once the SPRT decision variable D crosses the upper threshold A, it has made a decision that the path to the candidate is infected and fake, and that means a wormhole attack has been detected.
The time required to make this decision can be written as the product of the slot time duration , and the number of events required to cross the upper threshold A. Let this number of events be denoted by n where n is a combination of UNC and CHG events. If the number of UNC events be denoted by x and the number of CHG events be denoted by y such that n = x + y, then,
Let l and m represent the ratios P (CHG| H1) /P (CHG| H0) and P (UNC| H1) /P (UNC| H0) respectively. By definition, P wormhole denotes the probability that an event generated due to wormhole path to a neighbor is UNC and P legitimate denotes the probability that an event generated due to a legitimate path to a neighbor is UNC.
x n = P wormhole y n = 1 − P wormhole (19) Using (19) we arrive at the following relation
Applying log on both sides, we derive,
As described in this section,
where and n are defined as follows.
(1−P wormhole ) log 1−P wormhole 1−P legitimate +(P wormhole ) log P wormhole P legitimate (23) It is inferred that though detection time depends on network size, it is appealing to note that as nodes move with high velocity, the detection time decreases and detection time is inversely proportional to the wormhole range R wormhole as the probability of an event generated due to wormhole is increased.
B. ERROR RATE
Let α and β be the error probabilities that the SPRT decision engine, falsely accepts H 1 (false positive) and H 0 (false negative) respectively. Ho et al. [23] showed that these values are limited to α ≤ α/ (1 − β) and β ≤ β/ (1 − α). Depending on the system's requirements, the user can choose values for α and β thereby guaranteeing the maximum error rate for the system. However, a very low error rate may increase the detection time as more number of samples will be needed to make a decision. The user must choose α and β such that a balance is struck between the error rate of the system and the time required to detect a wormhole link.
VII. SYSTEM OVERHEADS
An analysis of the overheads involved in the proposed system in terms of communication, computation and storage aspects is presented in this section.
A. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
Communication overhead is defined as the number of extra packets transmitted as a whole by the network when the proposed scheme is employed. For this purpose, a finite time interval T is considered. One packet is broadcasted by each node to its neighbors at the end of every time slot to advertise its presence within their range. So, the number of packets transmitted during the interval T is given by ( T /ψ) × N , where N is the network size. Using (8) , the total number of advertisement packets in time T can be computed as
As a function of the number of nodes, the communication overhead of the mobile wormhole detection scheme in the network is hence O(N).
B. COMPUTATION OVERHEAD
The computation overhead of the scheme is defined as the number of decision variable updates performed by a single node. Whenever a node receives an advertisement packet from a neighbor, based on the event, it updates the corresponding SPRT decision variable. Therefore, the number of decision variable updates by a single node in a finite interval of time T is given by the product of the number of VOLUME 6, 2018 advertisement packets received from a single neighbor and the number of neighbors. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the nodes are evenly distributed in the network. Hence the number of neighbors of any node is given by the product of the node density and the transmission coverage area of that node. If a is the network area, then the node density is N /a. The transmission coverage area of any node becomes R node 2 . The number of advertisement packets transmitted in T is
2 − 1 as detailed in the previous section. Combining the elementary factors, the number of decision variable updates per node in T is
When written as a function of the number of nodes in the network, the computation overhead per node is hence O(N).
C. STORAGE OVERHEAD
The storage overhead of the proposed scheme is defined as the number of SPRT decision variables a node must store. Every node must store one decision variable for each neighbor. The number of neighbors of a node is given by (N /a)× R node 2 as detailed in the previous section. If k bytes are used to store details of a node, the total number of extra bytes a node must store as a result of implementing the proposed scheme is (N /a)× R node 2 ×k. The storage overhead of the proposed scheme per node as a function of the number of nodes in the network is hence O(N).
VIII. SIMULATION AND OBSERVATIONS
All simulations were performed using Omnet++ Network Simulation Framework with mobile sensor network functionality provided by the MiXiM Modeling Framework for 1000 seconds. Simulation specific configuration details are provided in the respective sub-sections. For the following experiments, two wormhole transceivers placed near the opposite corners of the network were used to simulate the wormhole attack. A network of mobile nodes varying in number from 100 to 1000, moving in random way point pattern with velocity [1 10]m/s and pause time of 2s is considered. The field dimension used for experiments is 2000m×2000m.
A. EFFICIENCY OF DETECTION
The experiment was conducted with values of R node , R wormhole and θ set to 50m, 700m and 30 • respectively. Number of nodes were varied from 100 to 1000 and the average error rate values were recorded. The node velocity range was [1, 10] m/s. The values of the system parameters (α, β) pair indicating the tolerable false positive and false negative threshold limits were modified and the error rate of the system was measured. In this context, the ratio of number of benign paths falsely detected as wormhole links to the total number of benign paths, define false positive rate (FP) and the ratio of the number of wormhole links falsely declared as benign to the total number of wormhole links, define false negative rate (FN) . Accordingly, true positive rate (TP) is defined as the ratio of the number of wormhole links declared correctly as wormhole to the total number of wormhole links and true negative (TN) as the ratio of the number of benign paths detected correctly as benign to the total number of benign paths. Fig. 8 shows the variations in false alarm rate as the parameters (α, β) are varied. The results of the experiment are in agreement to the error limits obtained from the discussion in section VI. With (α, β) pair set to (0.01,0.01), the false negative rate was obtained as 0 and the maximum false positive rate obtained was 0.002. It is observed that false alarm rates are lesser for low values of system parameters than for higher values. Therefore, if the application requires that the error rates be less, the administrator can choose suitably low values for (α, β).
Effect of node density on detection was analyzed by varying the network size. Detection rate is defined as TP-FP-FN and the results were plotted for various system parameters. It is observed from Fig. 9 that the detection rates did not vary significantly even when the number of nodes in the network was varied till 1200, although congestion did occur in the network.
Hence it is observed that the system can be adopted for varying node densities without affecting the detection efficiency.
B. EFFECT OF NODE MOBILITY ON ATTACKER's RISK
In this experiment, the parameters R node , R wormhole and θ were set to 50m, 700m and 30 • respectively. The number of nodes in the network was taken to be 500. According to the discussion in detection analysis section, the time required to detect an infected path decreases with increase in node velocity. Hence detections happen faster in networks with higher node mobility. However the communication overhead increases with increase in node velocities (please refer communication overhead section). Node velocities and parameters α and β were varied and the effect on detection time was observed.
The sample graph presented is observed for the values of α and β, both set to 0.01 and then varied to 0.1 and 0.2. As α and β are increased, the detection time was reduced considerably with a little increase in false alarm rate as discussed in the previous section. Fig. 10 shows the variation of detection time with increase in node velocity. It is seen that there is a linear decrease in the detection time with increase in velocity when higher detection rates are expected. Higher node velocities improve the system performance.
C. EFFECT OF WORMHOLE RANGE ON ATTACKER's RISK
This experiment was performed to study the effect of the illegitimate transceivers' range on the attacker's risk of being detected with the value of θ set to 20 • and R wormhole starting from 500m in a network of size 500.
In accordance with the discussion in speed of detection in section VI, the time required to detect a wormhole infected link decreased with an increase in the transceivers' range. Fig. 11 plots the speed factor for detecting an infected path for increasing values of wormhole range, compared to the range of 500m. That is, if an infected path is detected in y seconds when range is 500m, then it will be detected in y/3.5 seconds when range is 1700m. It is evident from the observations that although the increased wormhole range can act in favor of the adversary in terms of the damage done to the network, the risk of being detected early also increases along with it.
The next part of the experiment was conducted to study the effect of node density on detection. For each wormhole range, the nodes were varied in number from 500 to 1200 and the results on detection time were recorded and plotted in Fig. 12 .
It could be observed that though detection time increases with increasing node density, the effect of increasing nodes on detection time is compensated to some extent by the increase in the probability of more number of events collected to conclude the decision on wormhole links.
Hence the detection time variation is predominantly due to the wormhole range and as discussed previously, the system is efficient in the detection, on higher wormhole ranges and with reasonable system parameters as evident from Fig 13. 
D. EFFECT OF THETA ON ATTACKER's RISK
For this experiment, R wormhole = 700m was considered in the network having 500 nodes with velocity in the range of [1, 10] m/s. α and β values were both set to 0.2. In tandem with the discussion in speed of detection in section VI, the time required to detect an infected path decreases with an increase in the value of θ . Nonetheless, communication overhead [26] and [27] . increases as discussed earlier on overheads in section VII.
Since the values of R wormhole , V, α, and β are more application dependent, the value of θ can be chosen by the administrator to strike a trade-off between the detection time and the communication overhead.
Fig. 14 depicts the variation of detection time with increase in the value of θ . It is seen that there is a linear decrease in the detection time with increase in θ . Therefore, if the administrator requires lower detection times, he can increase, the value of θ suitably.
E. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
The proposed wormhole detection system has been compared on various parameters with two popular systems from the literature and the observations and findings are recorded as in Table 2 .
It could be observed that the average detection time and detection rate are comparable with [26] while it is far better than [27] at the cost of false positives. But the flexibility provided by the system in tuning system parameters, based on the application, to fix tolerable error rate and detection time limits, has been discussed in section VIII. Moreover the proposed system provides better support in detecting wormholes in mobile networks as compared to [26] and [27] with less overheads
IX. CONCLUSION
A decentralized scheme for wormhole detection is presented for mobile sensor network based systems on the idea of neighborhood changes, which adopts SPRT to make the decision on wormholes. The security of the system is evaluated; limitations on the attacker's advantage are provided and error rates of the system are analyzed. System overheads in terms of communication, computation and storage aspects are computed and the effect of system parameters on the proposed scheme is studied. Comparative analysis on various factors of detection is carried out. It was found that for appropriate values of system parameters, wormholes were detected using few packets and for systems involving highly mobile nodes, the performance is far better in terms of faster detection times.
